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Malicious cyber conduct sponsored by governments is on the increase, as 
well-documented cases involving China, Estonia, Georgia, Iran, Israel, North 
Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States indicate. Iran and the United 
States are expected to pursue their conflict in cyberspace following missile 
attacks on each other in Iraq in early January 2020.  States are pouring 
extraordinary resources into the capacity to carry out cyberattacks and other 
actions aimed at harming adversaries. The 2018 United States National Cyber 
Security Strategy seeks to justify the United States’ share of expenditures, saying 
the goal is “to use cyber capabilities to achieve national security objectives.”1 
The U.S. will impose “costs through cyber and non-cyber means.”2 In other 
words, U.S. government officials believe that introducing malware to computer 
systems, hacking into databases, accessing email and other forms of 
communication, and programming traps to ensnare trespassers will enhance a 
state’s cyber security and national security in general. This is a highly 
contentious assumption on which to base massive commitments of resources. 
However, the question here is not whether intentional cyber misconduct can 
achieve security. The question is whether such practices are lawful.  
The relevant answer to the question is international law.3 Cyber space is 
quintessentially supra-national. That said, lawful responses to cyber wrongdoing 
rest on a principle found in all law, not just international law. The principle of 
legality mandates that enforcement of the law must comply with the law. While 




* Robert & Marion Short Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, and Research Professor of 
International Dispute Resolution, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre 
Dame. 
1 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Sept. 
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War, 17 J. OF CONFLICT & 
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challenge respect for the rule of law today.4 This article will engage only one: 
the view that no law governs cyber space, that it is a law-free zone.5 No aspect 
of human society is a law-free zone. The sovereign state responding to violations 
of its rights, for example, is bound by the law of state responsibility. Action to 
enforce legal rights must target the agent legally responsible for the law 
violation.6 The accused party must have public notice and a chance to answer 
the accusation in all but rare cases involving emergency situations of self-
defense to armed attack. In the case of armed attack, the facts should be plain. 
Upon failure to comply with the law, the victim state may use coercive measures 
that are necessary and proportionate to the wrong. Necessity means coercion is 
a last resort and is likely to succeed in the circumstances.7  
Plenty of examples exist of revenge attacks and collective punishment in the 
name of deterrence. Such actions are in themselves law violations. Lawful 
responses, by contrast, start with the threshold requirement of determining 
whether a wrong has occurred. If so, the response must be against the responsible 
party, and it must be necessary and proportional to the wrong. In the case of 
cyber wrongs, the detailed rules on attribution and lawful, coercive responses 
are to be found in the international law of responsibility.8 Carrying out lawful 
cyber countermeasures to malicious cyber conduct is challenging given that 
perpetrators use sophisticated means to hide their identities. Accusations are 
often based on indirect evidence or inferences that are well below the 
international legal standard of clear and convincing.9 For this reason, the great 
effort involved in creating and deploying offensive cyber measures is largely 
wasted by governments concerned with law compliance. Defensive strategies 
are the far better investment. 
These conclusions are reached by first examining the cyber attribution issue 
in the context of today’s malicious cyber conduct. The discussion will move on 




4 Consider, for example, the ideology of realism, adhered to by the foreign policy establishment of 
most NATO member countries. Realism embraces an antipathy for law, preferring the strong man leader 
with unfettered power to use military force. REBECCA SANDERS, PLAUSIBLE LEGALITY: LEGAL CULTURE 
AND POLITICAL IMPERATIVE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 20–21 (Oxford University Press ed. 2018). 
5 Id. 
6 The International Law Commission has set out in detail when action is attributable to a state in its 
work known as the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, an effort accepted by the UN General Assembly 
in 2001 in lieu of proceeding toward a multilateral treaty. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 
Fifty-Third Session: Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at ¶ 76 (2001) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. The Articles on State 
Responsibility say little about why attribution must be made perhaps because the point is so widely 
accepted as basic fairness and common sense, concepts most people understand instinctually. For more 
on general principles, see generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS in THE LIBRARY OF WORLD AFFAIRS 21 (George W. Keeton 
& Georg Schwarzenberger eds. 1953). 
7 See infra. 
8 The United Nations International Law Commission has drafted two sets of articles restating the 
general principles of responsibility applicable to states and international organizations respectively. 
International law principles of responsibility applicable to individuals (natural and juridical) are found in 
various sets of rules, including human rights, international criminal law, and international economic law 
treaties. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, at ¶ 76 (2001); Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations, U.N. Doc A/66/10, at ¶ 87 (2011). This article will focus on state responsibility. 
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second Part will also set out the international legal standard of clear and 
convincing evidence for satisfying the conditions involved in lawful cyber 
countermeasures. This Part will underscore that while cyber offense is rarely 
lawful, cyber defense always is.  
 
 
I. CYBER HACKS, ATTACKS, AND TRAPS 
 
 
This Part looks at cases of cyber misconduct linked to governments. The 
cases provide an overview of the type of malicious cyber conduct that is 
prevalent in the world today. The law regulating such misconduct is discussed 
in the next Part.  
On June 20, 2019, Iran used a missile to shoot down a United States Navy 
drone conducting, according to the U.S., intelligence gathering from outside 
Iran’s borders. In response, the United States threatened to attack inside Iran 
using manned aircraft. President Trump tweeted that he called off the attack with 
ten minutes to spare because it risked killing an estimated 150 people. He 
deemed that such an attack would be disproportionate in response to the 
destruction of an unmanned drone. Instead, “U.S. Cyber Command conducted a 
cyber operation against Iranian missile and rocket command and control systems 
in response to the drone attack . . . .”10 Later media reports indicated that U.S. 
cyberattacks wiped out Iranian databases and disrupted communications by an 
Iranian military unit concerned with maritime matters in the Persian Gulf.11 The 
reports, based on information from “unnamed officials,” indicated that the U.S. 
intended to avoid interference with Iranian missiles or rockets owing to the risk 
of escalation.12 As with their earlier use of the Stuxnet computer worm against 
Iran during the Obama administration, U.S. officials apparently want adversaries 
and allies alike to know the U.S. has caused computer damage, while at the same 
time attempting some plausible deniability of actions that are in themselves 
unlawful.13  
Some commentators criticized the attacks not because they were unlawful 
but because Iran and other adversaries learned of their systems’ vulnerabilities 




10 Michael Schmitt, Top Expert Backgrounder: Aborted U.S. Strike, Cyber Operation Against Iran 
and International Law, JUST SECURITY (June 24, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64669/top-expert-
backgrounder-on-aborted-u-s-strike-and-cyber-operation-against-iran-and-international-law/. 
11 See generally Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Cyberattacks Hurt Iran’s Ability to Target Oil Tankers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attack.html; Zak 
Doffman, Secret U.S. Cyber Mission Devastated Iran’s Attack Capabilities, Officials Say, FORBES (Aug. 
29, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/29/secret-cyber-mission-devastated-irans-
attack-capabilities-us-officials-say/#def2db75cb35. 
12 James Hilder, Computer Virus Used to Sabotage Iran’s Nuclear Plan “Built by US and Israel”, 
AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 27, 2011), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/computer-virus-used-to-
sabotage-irans-nuclear-plans-built-by-us-and-israel/news-story/08eaf40536d1a14ca4fb39db2d396e7e. 
13 Barnes, supra note 11; Robert Chesney, A Cyber Command Operational Update: Clarifying the 
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eliminated, U.S. intelligence agencies no longer have the access they once did.14 
Nor is lost access necessarily the worst consequence. The Stuxnet episode taught 
that those targeted by malware can do more than patch computer program 
security failures. A foe like Iran can be hit in new ways but also should be 
expected to develop the digital means to hit back.15 One computer expert 
referred to such so-called “cyberwars” as “boomerang wars.”16  
The United States developed the Stuxnet computer virus, which was able to 
leap across most known defenses to sabotage Iranian nuclear research. This, 
however, inspired Iran to create Shamoon, a computer virus it used in an attack 
that wiped out the hard drives in over 30,000 computers at the Saudi Aramco 
company. Saudi Arabia is an ally of the U.S. and competitor of Iran for influence 
in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia reacted to Iran’s attack by developing a 
cyberspace “garrison.” “The Saudis had understandable reasons for arming 
themselves in cyberspace. Iran had reportedly launched the ‘Shamoon’ virus in 
mid-2012, crippling tens of thousands of Saudi computers that took nearly half 
a year to repair. The kingdom also faced deadly terrorist threats, especially after 
the fireball of the Islamic State exploded across Syria and Iraq in 2014.”17 In 
response to the ‘Shamoon’ virus, the Saudis contracted with the private Italian 
firm Hacking Team, Israeli firms NSO Group and its affiliate, Q Cyber 
Technologies, and the Emirati firm DarkMatter. Additionally, the Saudis 
acquired a sophisticated phone hacking system called Pegasus from Q Cyber 
Technologies with the permission of the Israeli government. While it would be 
surprising for Israel to permit the Saudi government to acquire such knowhow, 
in doing so, Israel could both improve relations with a long-antagonistic country 
and enhance its own intelligence gathering there and elsewhere. 
Pegasus allows a hacker to access a smartphone’s microphones and cameras 
to surveille the user. The Saudi government allegedly used the program in the 
well-publicized murder of Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, in October 2018.18 
Khashoggi had been part of an effort to counter Saudi government use of social 
media to repress legitimate political dissent. After threats to him and his family, 
arrests of colleagues, and a determined misinformation campaign, Khashoggi 
fled to the United States where he continued his efforts by writing for the 
Washington Post. Pegasus allowed the Saudis to learn of Khashoggi’s plans to 
travel to Istanbul and the Saudi consulate to apply for a visa for his fiancée. 




14 P.W. Singer, ‘Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War,’ by Fred Kaplan, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/books/review/dark-territory-the-secret-history-of-
cyber-war-by-fred-kaplan.html. 
15 Ilan Gattegno, Exclusive: Stuxnet Was Out of Control, Kaspersky Had to Reveal It, ISRAEL HAYOM 
(June 13, 2013), https://www.israelandstuff.com/exclusive-stuxnet-virus-was-out-of-control-kaspersky-
had-to-reveal-it. 
16 David Ignatius, How a Chilling Cyberwar Ensnared Jamal Khashoggi, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-a-chilling-saudi-cyberwar-ensn 
ared-jamal-khashoggi/2018/12/07/f5f048fe-f975-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html. For a detailed 
look at Hacker Team and other similar companies, see Mattathias Schwartz, Cyberwar, Inc. Inside the 
Global Software Industry That Turned Email Hacking Into a Weapon for Sale, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
(Jan. 8, 2017). 
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These various incidents give a sense of the widespread and variable uses of 
computers to harm. Every individual using a computer is both vulnerable to 
malicious cyber conduct and a potential perpetrator of it. This conduct can be 
divided into two general categories: cyberattacks and cyber espionage. Both 
categories involve the use of “malware.” The word “malware” is a shortened 
form of the two-word phrase “malicious software.”20 Malware is used in 
cyberattacks, which are acts “of unauthorized altering, deleting, disrupting, 
damaging or suppressing data within targeted computerized systems or 
networks.”21 It is also used in cyber espionage acts “of accessing or storing”22 
confidential data on computers. Anyone with an email account is familiar with 
techniques used in attacks and espionage. Service providers and information 
technology (IT) departments warn constantly not to open suspicious attachments 
and to update systems with the latest computer security software. They are in a 
constant race with hackers looking for vulnerabilities. In the last several years, 
some computer security specialists have begun to advocate moving beyond 
“passive” to “active” cyber defense.23 Passive measures are intended to remain 
within a computer or computer network, such as firewalls, antivirus programs, 
and intrusion detection software.24 Active defenses are intended to affect other 
computers and external networks that have been or could potentially be the 
source of malicious cyber conduct aimed at the defender. Active cyber defenses 
include programs that track data thefts to identify hackers and even to retrieve 
stolen information.25 Active defense programs also deploy traps to lure hackers 
to decoy networks or cause them to infect their own computers and networks 
with malware.26  
There is no difference between malicious cyber conduct and active cyber 
defenses in some cases. The label depends on the perspective of the 
commentator. The United States government hacked into Iranian computers for 
defensive purposes, as did the Iranian government respecting Saudi computers. 
The Saudi government, in its turn, plainly considers people such as Khashoggi 
to be threats. Spying on him is part of a national security strategy. The financial 
incentives to produce offensive cyber measures are substantial. So, despite the 
law, by 2010, defense contractors were using Cold War terms and analogies to 
shape perceptions and government budgets.  
 
The United States is fighting a cyber-war today, and we are 
losing. It’s that simple. . . . What is the right strategy for this 




20 Alexandra Van Dine, When is Cyber Defense a Crime? Evaluating Active Cyber Defense Measures 
Under the Budapest Convention, CHICAGO J. OF INT’L L. (forthcoming), citing Norton, What is Malware 
and How Can We Prevent It?, NORTON SECURITY CENTER, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-
malware.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in 
Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 429, 474 (2012); Paul Rosenzweig, International Law and Private 
Actor Active Cyber Defense Measures, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 103–105 (2014). 
24 Kesan & Hayes, supra note 23, at 474. 
25 CTR. FOR CYBER & HOMELAND SECURITY, GEO. WASH. UNIV., INTO THE GRAY ZONE, THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR AND ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST CYBER THREATS 11–12 (Oct. 2016). 
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when the United States faced an existential threat from the 
Soviet Union, we relied on deterrence to protect ourselves from 
nuclear attack.  Later, as the East-West stalemate ended and 
nuclear weapons proliferated, some argued that preemption 
made more sense in an age of global terrorism. The cyber-war 
mirrors the nuclear challenge in terms of the potential economic 
and psychological effects. So, should our strategy be deterrence 
or preemption? The answer: both. Depending on the nature of 
the threat, we can deploy aspects of either approach to defend 
America in cyberspace.27 
 
Offensive cyberattacks, whether for defense, active defense, preemption or 
deterrence, however, will in almost no case meet the conditions of a lawful 
response.  
The challenges of keeping the Internet secure for legitimate uses in such a 
reality are well known. Software developers are constantly creating defenses, 
but public and private actors also heavily invest in aggressive responses that 
flout the law in the name of the asserted higher goal of individual security. The 
attitude is consistent with a general decline in respect for the rule of law. It has 
led to uninformed commentary that there is no law or virtually no law applicable 
to cyberspace binding on sovereign states.28 The next section lays out evidence 
to the contrary.  
 
 
II. CYBER MISCONDUCT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
International law, like all law, exists to provide an alternative to violence 
and status in creating good order within human communities.29 Wherever people 
come together, examples of law can be found. This is as true of cyberspace as 
any tangible geographic location. For each of the examples of cyber misconduct 
just reviewed, international law provides restrictions. Certain narrow exceptions 
are permitted for coercive measures of law enforcement. This discussion will 









27 Mike McConnell, Mike McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-War We’re Losing, DAILY CALLER 
(Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR201002250 
2493.html (paragraph breaks omitted).  
28 Stewart A. Baker & Charles J. Dunlap Jr., What is the Role of Lawyers in Cyberwarfare?, ABA 
JOURNAL (May 1, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/what_is_the_role_ 
of_lawyers_in_cyberwarfare.  
29 According to Zoller, anthropologists support this reason for the emergence of law. ELISABETH 
ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 4 (1984). See also 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 87–91 (2d ed. 1994); Ian Brownlie, The Peaceful Settlement of 
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A. THE PROHIBITIONS ON FORCE AND INTERVENTION 
 
This section begins with the use of force, which is the least relevant area of 
restrictive law for the cases reviewed above. Nevertheless, the United States 
government and legal scholars, heavily influenced by realism, have long sought 
to characterize cyberspace as falling principally within the military domain. 
After a brief explanation of why that characterization is unconvincing, the 
discussion will move on to other more applicable legal principles: non-
intervention, property, and privacy rights.  
Following World War II, the most catastrophic war in history, the United 
States led the way toward creating a legal regime to prevent future armed 
conflicts. The United Nations Charter restates the ancient, peremptory norm 
prohibiting the use of force in Article 2(4):  
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
Article 2(4) prohibits the use of armed force of some significance. Minor 
uses of force, such as shooting across the bow of a ship as part of an arrest 
operation or shooting across a border at people throwing rocks, fall below the 
scope threshold of Article 2(4). These forms of force fall within the scope of 
other prohibitory and protective principles.30  In September 2005, the sovereign 
states of the world gathered in New York to reconfirm their commitment to strict 
compliance with Article 2(4) and the Charter’s other provisions regulating the 
resort to force.31 A violation of Article 2(4) requires significant physical damage 
or destruction. The focus is on the violence, not the means to produce it. That 
said, computers are a means to communicate with or control a potentially lethal 
force. They are not the lethal forces or weapons themselves. A simple analogy 
clarifies the point: an old-fashioned stick of dynamite might be used as a weapon 
once the fuse is lighted. We do not refer to the means of lighting the fuse, such 




30 Mary Ellen O’Connell, The True Meaning of Force, AJIL UNBOUND (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www. 
asil.org/blogs/true-meaning-force (replying to Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries 
of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 159 (2014)).  
31 G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 77–80 (Sept. 16, 2005).  
32 It is on the erroneous basis that the computer malware is the match and dynamite, not just the 
match, that underlies the approach of the INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL], 
critically reviewed in Dieter Fleck, Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyber Warfare—A 
Critical First Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual,18 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 331 (2013). For 
another example of this problematic approach, see YAROSLAV RADZIWILL, CYBER-ATTACKS AND THE 
EXPLOITABLE IMPERFECTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). In the second version of the manual, 
where the authors appropriately emphasize countermeasures over the use of force, they still mention the 
view that cyber operations producing no physical destruction or injury to people could nevertheless be a 
use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4). INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 333 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) 
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Scholars who apparently understand that international law is generally the 
relevant law for cyber security questions may still argue that it is difficult to fit 
cyber problems into the rules of international law with respect to the use of 
force.33 Instead of concluding, therefore, that it is necessary to look at other 
international rules, such as those on non-intervention, countermeasures, 
economic law, and the like, these scholars advocate new interpretations of the 
rules on the use of force in order to have the right to respond to cyber problems 
with military force.34    
None of the cases in Part I involve a violation of Article 2(4). The United 
States’ plan to attack Iran with manned aircraft potentially killing 150 people 
would have been a clear violation. Article 2(4) prohibits even threatening such 
an operation, but threats are so common that the attempt to restrict them under 
Article 2(4), in distinction to actual attacks, has fallen into desuetude.35 Iran’s 
destruction of a U.S. drone and the U.S. response involving manipulation of 
Iranian computers fall under the principle of non-intervention and international 
economic law property protections.  
The principle of non-intervention reaches these lesser forms of force, as well 
as forms of coercion not involving the use of armed force.36 Many specific 
examples are provided in the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention of 1981, including that it is the duty of a state 
“in the conduct of its international relations in the economic, social, technical 
and trade fields, to refrain from measures which would constitute interference 
or intervention in the internal or external affairs of another State . . . .”37  
Non-intervention protects the equality of states under international law. 
Without it, a legal order could only be based on an imperial or hegemonic law-
giver. The international legal system is founded on a principle of state equality, 
as the United Nations Charter reflects. The Charter confirms that a goal of the 
UN is to establish “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace . . . .”38 For Russell Buchan, 
the prohibition on intervention can be discerned in part by distinguishing the 
conduct prohibited under the rule from mere interference. Intervention involves 
coercion, while mere interference is an “inevitable by-product of an increasingly 




33 See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 913, 920–23 (1999). See also 
Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99, 103–08 (2002). 
34 Waxman returns to the advocacy of some scholars during the Cold War for expanded rights to use 
military force by resorting to novel interpretations of the plain terms of the UN Charter and rules of 
customary international law in Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the 
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 425–426 (2011).  
35 But see Nicholas Tsagourias, The Prohibition of Threats of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM 
67 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013).  
36 G.A. Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal 
Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981) [hereinafter Declaration on Non-intervention]; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).  
37 Declaration on Non-intervention, supra note 36, at Pt. II, ¶ k. 
38 U.N. Charter art. 1(2). 
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the application of pressure to subvert the will of the target. In international 
relations, it is “dictatorial interference. . . in the affairs of another State for the 
purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things.”40 Buchan 
concludes that inter-sovereign state cyber espionage, like espionage in general, 
is likely prohibited by international law only when it involves coercion.41 
 
B. SPYING AND THEFT 
 
Given the less stringent restrictions on non-coercive espionage, some states 
apparently attempt to characterize theft of commercially valuable data as 
espionage. China, for example, bases its very identity as a nation on its economy, 
and plausibly argues that promoting its economic interests by any means is the 
same as promoting its national security. The United States has taken issue with 
this perspective. In 2015, President Obama and President Xi agreed on several 
important conceptual points, including: 
 
The United States and China agree that neither country’s 
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled 
theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other 
confidential business information, with the intent of providing 
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.  
 
Both sides are committed to making common effort to further 
identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in 
cyberspace within the international community.  The United 
States and China welcome the July 2015 report of the UN 
Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 
which addresses norms of behavior and other crucial issues for 
international security in cyberspace.  The two sides also agree 
to create a senior experts group for further discussions on this 
topic.42  
 
International law protects the property rights of states and individuals. The 
right of states to sovereign control over geographic space—land territory, the air 
column above it, and maritime space appurtenant to it—is protected by the 
principles on the non-use of force and non-intervention. Additional property 
protections are found in the exceptions for both the use of force and other forms 
of coercion, including countermeasures that involve freezing assets and other 
forms of takings.43 Other forms of property, such as natural resources and other 




40 Id. (citing LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 305 (H. Lauterpacht, ed., 1955)). 
41 BUCHAN, supra note 39, at 65. 
42 White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United 
States (Sept. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-
president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.  
43 See U.N. Charter 2(4), 51. For a recent, comprehensive discussion of the international law of armed 
self-defense, which includes the role of the Security Council, see MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, CHRISTIAN 
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with principles such as sovereign and diplomatic immunity extended to certain 
property to protect them from proceedings in foreign national courts.44 States 
also have certain due process rights that must be honored before being deprived 
of non-immune assets. With respect to human beings, officials of states enjoy 
immunity when acting in their official capacity, which includes protection of 
their private property.45 For private individuals, Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to own 
property alone as well as in association with others.” It also declares that no 
person will be deprived arbitrarily of property.46  
Human beings clearly possess a human right to privacy. States may also take 
certain measures to protect their confidential information. Espionage to obtain 
policy-related secrets lacking a commercial application may be prosecuted in 
national courts for violation of domestic law but likely does not violate 
international law if coercive methods are avoided.47 States may also protect the 
privacy rights of their nationals from cyber espionage using countermeasures. 
The nature of personal privacy rights is being developed through, in particular, 
the global application of the European Union’s General Data Privacy 
Regulation.48 For the purposes of this analysis, the even more important 
international law duty is the one that requires states to exercise due diligence 
over their nationals using the Internet.49 States have a duty to take active steps 
to prevent cybercrimes.50 Some cybercrimes did not exist before the invention 
of the personal computer, such as theft of Bitcoin. Others pre-date computers, 
but criminals use computers in carrying them out today, such as spying. 
 
 
III. LAWFUL RESPONSES TO CYBER MISCONDUCT  
 
 
As mentioned at several points above, the use of military force in response 
to malicious cyber operations not connected with kinetic violence is always 
unlawful. In contrast, countermeasures are generally lawful, so long as the 
conditions provided in international law are met. The same sort of coercive 
measures that are lawful to use against economic wrongs and violations of arms 




44 G.A. Res. 59/38, annex, United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property (Dec. 2, 2004). 
45 David P. Stewart, The Immunity of State Officials Under the UN Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property, 44 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1047 (2011). 
46 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). See also Case C-
402/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.  
47 BUCHAN, supra note 39, at 66. See also Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law 
and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 179, 185, 197–207 (2011). 
48 The GDPR has its own website: https://eugdpr.org/. 
49 For an excellent discussion of the general due diligence obligation of states vis-à-vis their nationals, 
see TIM STEPHENS & DUNCAN FRENCH, SECOND REPORT ON DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2016), https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=1427&StorageFileGuid=ed22 
9726-4796-47f2-b891-8cafa221685f. 
50 For details of what counts in the international community as “cybercrime,” see Budapest 
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“sanctions,”51 are lawful for use against malicious cyber conduct. Using cyber 
operations as countermeasures is more difficult to fit in the lawful 
countermeasure category. This Part analyzes the conditions of taking lawful 
countermeasures in response to cyber misconduct, focusing on the lawful 
purpose of countermeasures, attribution, necessity, and proportionality. The 
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) has included the general 
principles of law regulating countermeasures in its Articles on State 
Responsibility, accepted by the General Assembly in 2001.52 The 2017 Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations analyzes 
the Articles using examples of cyber operations, supporting the conclusion that 
countermeasures are the lawful means of applying coercive measures in 
response to interstate violations of rights associated with computers.53  
Countermeasures are lawful actions taken in response to a prior unlawful 
action. The responding state must provide public notice of the claim of 
wrongdoing before instituting countermeasures. If, upon received notice, the 
accused does not end the unlawful conduct and provide a remedy within a 
reasonable period, the responding state has demonstrated the necessity of 
imposing a proportionate countermeasure so long as it is aimed at inducing law 
compliance.54 The ILC defines countermeasures as a defense to an otherwise 
unlawful action: “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a state not in conformity with 
an international obligation towards another state is precluded if and to the extent 
that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter state in 
accordance with” other conditions set out in the Articles.55 
The Articles on State Responsibility explicitly require that the state taking 
countermeasures against another state be responding to a wrong under 
international law since the purpose of countermeasures is to procure compliance 
with an obligation or to serve as a remedy for a past violation. Recall from the 
discussion above that, in many areas of international law, the foreign state has 
committed a wrong both if it has directly violated a duty and if it has failed to 
exercise due diligence respecting nationals. Prior to taking the measure, the 
injured state must notify the state accused of wrongdoing of its intention and 




51 The definitions of the terms “countermeasures” and “sanctions” are not a settled matter in 
international law.  White and Abass, for example, define countermeasures as non-forcible measures taken 
by states and sanctions as non-forcible measures taken by organizations. This would be a helpful 
distinction but for the fact that the United States, for example, labels its unilateral, non-forcible coercive 
measures “sanctions”. See generally Nigel White & Ademola Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010).  
52 Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 22, 49–54, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at ¶ 76 (2001). 
53 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 32, at 111–142. An earlier, though more limited, analysis is 
found in O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War, supra note 3 (drawing on the Articles on State 
Responsibility and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 52–57 
(Sept. 25)).  
54 Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 
at ¶ 76 (2001). 
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although countermeasures may never involve the use of force unless consistent 
with the Charter regime, even in urgent situations.56  
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 authors do not mention the notice requirement in 
their discussion of procedural aspects of countermeasures law. They provide a 
hypothetical to exemplify a lawful cyber countermeasure, but in fact owing to 
the failure to provide notice, the countermeasure is unlawful. The scenario 
involves two states at the end of an armed conflict that agree to share information 
for family reunification. When one state does not provide the required 
information, the other hacks into the relevant database and obtains it.57 The 
hypothetical measure is proportionate but nevertheless unlawful in at least two 
respects. As the ICJ pointed out in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, the countermeasure 
must aim at the entitlement of the injured state.58 In this case, the entitlement is 
to be given information, not to have the information, let alone to take it. The 
Manual authors argue that the injured state is enforcing a wider obligation to aid 
in family reunification while getting the specific information it was promised. 
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, however, Slovakia used a measure to obtain the 
equivalent of the final outcome of its treaty with Hungary. That is not, however, 
Slovakia’s entitlement. It was to have Hungary’s cooperation in obtaining the 
outcome. The countermeasure needed to aim at inducing Hungary’s cooperation.  
Specifically, on the issue of public notice, the Manual authors are silent. In 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Slovakia gave Hungary plenty of notice of the action it 
would take as a countermeasure if Hungary did not honor their bilateral treaty.59 
In the Manual’s hypothetical, no notice is provided to the state failing in its duty. 
Perhaps it would be enough for the injured state to say, “either provide the 
information, or we will obtain it clandestinely.” That would surely cause the 
breaching state to reinforce security around the data—computer security as well 
as conventional. In the Corfu Channel case the ICJ admonished the United 
Kingdom for using unlawful means to obtain evidence for its case against 
Albania.60 The UK entered Albanian waters without permission and for purposes 
other than navigation. Among the several problems with the UK action, one is 
that the UK failed to give notice to Albania of the measure it would take. 
In order to provide this notice, the state planning to take a countermeasure 
must have clear and convincing evidence that the wrong is attributable to a 
foreign, sovereign state. More importantly, the actual wrong doer must be 
identified at the requisite level of legal certainty before a coercive measure to 
enforce legal rights may be imposed. To do otherwise is to offend principles of 
legality that require, as a matter of fairness, punishment be imposed only on the 
perpetrator and not on the innocent. A state must also be able to legally attribute 
the action before taking a coercive measure as an aspect of the principle of 
legality. As with the lawful exercise of force, a coercive response may only be 
against a state bearing legal responsibility for the wrong that triggered the right 




56 Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 52(1)(b), U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, at ¶ 76 (2001).  
57 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 32, at 117. 
58 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 52–57 (Sept. 25). 
59 Id. 
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principles of attribution. As secondary or process rules of fundamental 
importance, the law of attribution belongs with the general principles of 
necessity and proportionality.61 The ICJ emphasized the importance of links of 
responsibility in the Nicaragua, Congo, and Bosnia v. Serbia cases.62  
While the Articles on State Responsibility say little about why attribution 
must be made—perhaps because the point is so widely accepted as basic fairness 
and common sense, concepts most people understand instinctually—arguments 
to justify coercive action are heard so commonly today that it is worth 
emphasizing that acting against a party bearing no legal responsibility is itself a 
wrong. Regardless of whether it is used as a message or to deter other 
wrongdoers, it violates the law. With respect to the use of force, arguments are 
being made that dilute attribution to the vanishing point, with the aim of creating 
broader rights to use force on the territory of states bearing no legal 
responsibility for wrongdoing.63 It is still the law, however, that attacking a state 
in such circumstances is itself a violation of the prohibition. The contrary view 
seems to have found a place in international law due to a belief that greater 
security can be won through greater use of military force and coercion of all 
kinds.  
The standard of evidence for proving all the conditions required in 
countermeasures is the general one in government cases: clear and convincing. 
There is no standard for making mere accusations. As with threats, these are so 
common, that they remain in the ungoverned world of political rhetoric. Only in 
formal processes are standards set, such as the process of taking 
countermeasures in the enforcement of norms. The International Court of Justice 
has a standard in its rules, Article 38(2), which requires a “succinct statement of 
the facts and grounds on which the claim is based.”64 In the larger realm of inter-
state claims and accusations that only rarely reach the ICJ, however, an 
accusation is no more than a retorsion.  It may be an unfriendly act but in the 
world of diplomacy and inter-state communications, it is difficult to say that 
even unlawful threats of military force are prohibited given that they are so 
common. A potentially false accusation of malicious cyber conduct is well 
within that outer limit. The only real limit is political embarrassment should the 
accusation be disproved. 
Prior to taking a countermeasure, however, the basic evidentiary standard 
for court actions and the one to use for credible accusations of cyber misconduct 




61 NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (Oxford University Press 2008). 
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 93–116 (June 27); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 148–66 (Dec. 19); Application of the Genocide Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 385–412 (Feb. 26). 
63 See, for example, the campaign for substituting a concept that a state is “unwilling” or “unable” to 
control terrorism on its territory as a substitute for principles of attribution as sufficient to exercise force 
in self-defense on the territory of the “unwilling/unable” state. See also Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense 
Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM J. INT’L L.770, 773 (2012).  
64 See International Court of Justice, Rules of Court (1978), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/rules. 
65 “Clear and convincing” is higher than “preponderance of the evidence,” which is generally required 
in civil cases, but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” needed for criminal cases. See Mary Ellen 
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attribution and the other conditions. The extensive attribution rules, of the 




66 Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 4–11:  
 
Article 4 
Conduct of organs of a State 
 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit 
of the State.  
 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with 
the internal law of the State.  
 
Article 5 
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority 
 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 
but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international 




Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State 
 
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be 
considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is acting 
in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose 
disposal it is placed.  
 
Article 7 
Excess of authority or contravention of instructions 
 
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds 
its authority or contravenes instructions.  
 
Article 8 
Conduct directed or controlled by a State 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 




Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising 
elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official 
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the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations: “[c]yber operations 
conducted by organs of a State, or by persons or entities empowered by domestic 
law to exercise elements of governmental authority, are attributable to the 
State.”67 
The Articles on State Responsibility also provide guidance for judging the 
proportionality and necessity of resorting to countermeasures. To be 
proportional, “[c]ountermeasures must be commensurate with the injury 
suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and 
the rights in question.”68 They must not injure third states, and they must be 





Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement 
 
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government 
of a State shall be considered an act of that State under international law.  
 
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in 
establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory 
under its administration shall be considered an act of the new State under 
international law.  
 
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any conduct, 
however related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an 
act of that State by virtue of articles 4 to 9.  
 
Article 11 
Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own 
 
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall 
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the 
extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.  
 
67 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 32, at 87. 
68 Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
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in the Articles on State Responsibility,69 as well as the general principle of 
necessity.70  
All of these conditions of lawful countermeasures add up to formidable 
barriers to using malicious cyber conduct as a countermeasure. Coercive 
measures, including so-called “active cyber defenses,” are a gamble that aim 
only at future deterrence. They do not work to achieve immediate protection. 
They have little or no chance of ending a wrong immediately or inducing a state 
to provide a remedy. Governments using malicious cyber operations have shown 
no inclination to announce ahead of time that they will use cyberattacks until the 
target state complies. Secrecy is the hallmark of cyber misconduct. Nor is 
proportionality achievable, let alone restricting effects to the wrongdoer. As with 
Stuxnet, the effects of malware are difficult to control. Stuxnet damaged 
“100,000 computers all over Europe. There was a need to stop it. Cyberwars act 
like boomerangs . . . . So, it would be advisable for governments not to enter 









1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State unless the act: 
 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril; and 
 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: 
 
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity; or  
 
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
 
Article 49 
Object and limits of countermeasures 
 
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is 
responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to 
comply with its obligations under part two.  
 
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of 
international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible 
State.  
 
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the 
resumption of performance of the obligations in question.  
 
UN ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, art. 52 requires public notice and an opportunity to negotiate a 
settlement of the dispute prior to imposing countermeasures. 
70 BIN CHENG, supra note 6, at 70–7, 71, 74 (citing THE NEPTUNE, 4 INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
MANUSCRIPTS 372 (1797)). 
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The Tallinn Manual 2.0 suggests that necessity is a discrete defense, 
separate from the law of countermeasures that may apply in the “cyber context” 
when taken to protect an “essential interest” of the state.72 The argument, based 
on theory, rather than reality, of harming another state to protect the state’s own 






Plainly, it is difficult to meet these requirements when using cyber 
misconduct to respond to cyber misconduct.74 Note the paradox when a state like 
the United States, which purports to want to “encourage universal adherence to 
cyber norms,” uses malicious cyber operations for any reason:  
 
International law and voluntary non-binding norms of 
responsible state behavior in cyberspace provide stabilizing, 
security enhancing standards that define acceptable behavior to 
all states and promote greater predictability and stability in 
cyberspace. The United States will encourage other nations to 
publicly affirm these principle and views through enhanced 
outreach and engagement in multilateral fora. Increased public 
affirmation by the United States and other governments will 
lead to accepted expectations of state behavior and thus 
contribute to greater predictability and stability in 
cyberspace.75 
 
Defensive measures that do not include offensive aspects, such as a “honey 
trap,” are always lawful and require no attribution or satisfaction of the 
conditions of necessity and proportionality. In the 2019 U.S.-Iran case, no doubt 
many believe that damaging computers rather than killing people was laudable. 
They overlook that it was not an either-or choice. Responses in compliance with 





72 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 32, at 135. 
73 Id. at 137. 
74 Alexandra Perina, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at ASIL Annual Meeting: Countermeasures in 
Cyberspace (Apr. 10, 2014) (The various elements examined here are unlikely to have been part of the 
assessment in Remarks of Alexandra Perina, U.S. State Department, on necessity as a defense to the use 
of cyberattacks in responding to cyber espionage, theft and damage. ASIL Annual Meeting, Panel: 
Countermeasures in Cyberspace, Apr. 11, 2014.). 
75 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 1, at 20. 
